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Similarities and Differences in Eyewitness 
Testimonies of Children Who Directly 
Versus Vicariously Experience Stress 
MARC A. LINDBERG 
SUSAN JONES 
LISA McCOMAS COLLARD 
STUART W. THOMAS 
Marshall University 
~ _ _ _  ~~ 
ABSTRACT. This study tested questions of ecological validity by comparing the eyewit- 
ness testimonies of children directly experiencing a painful inoculation experience with 
those of children in a yoked-control group who vicariously experienced the inoculation on 
videotape. The study involved 86 5-year-olds, divided between 2 groups: the experiential 
and yoked control. The experiential group was followed through a health department with 
a video camera as they received diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus (DFT), and oral polio inoc- 
ulations. They were tested immediately, 20 min later, and I month later. Each child in the 
yoked-control group merely watched the videotape of his or her counterpart in the expe- 
nential group, made similar ratings of pain, and was given the same tests and suggestions. 
Stress and personal experience affected items congruent with the stressor to produce flash- 
bulb-like memories, with slower rates of forgetting for some items, such as nurse identi- 
fications, and greater suggestibility for other items, such as estimates of needle size. These 
and the apparently conflicting results in the literature were said to make sense when per- 
sonally experienced stress was viewed from S.-A. Christianson’s (1992) interactive per- 
spective rather than as a single ubiquitous variable. 
Key words: children, direct experience of stress, eyewitness testimonies, vicarious expe- 
rience of stress 
CAN OUR STUDIES of eyewitness testimony be generalized to real cases of 
abuse? That question has been hotly debated in the laboratory, clinic, and court- 
room, and it involves several related issues and methodologies. In explorations of 
children’s eyewitness memories, one of two research strategies has generally been 
employed. Either researchers have tested children’s recall of slides or videotapes, 
or they have tested children’s memories for personally experienced and often 
painful medical procedures. Therefore, an important question is, “In what ways 
do the memories of children viewing videotapes parallel those who actually expe- 
rience painful or stressful events?” The answer to this question is particularly 
3 14 
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Lindberg. Jones, McComas Collard, & Thomas 3 IS 
important when seeking to generalize results from the laboratory to cases of eye- 
witness testimony involving stressful or traumatic events. such as physical or sex- 
ual abuse (Ceci, 199 1 ; Goodman, Quas, Batterman-Faunce, Riddlesberger, Rid- 
dlesberger, & Kuhn, 1996; Goodman, Rudy, Bottoms. & Aman, 1989; Yuille & 
Wells, 1991). Steward and Steward (1996, pp. 1 1 ,  27), for example, have pro- 
posed that “the results of bystander eyewitness research may underestimate the 
report of the child who has been physically and/or sexually abused,” and that “dis- 
tress may be a critical mediator that filters children’s reporting of remembered 
events.” Pynoos (1992) and Yuille and Tollstrup ( 1992). on the other hand, have 
reasoned that personal injury or penetration can cause attention to be more 
focused on internal rather than external stimuli, leading to relatively poorer mem- 
ories for some of the events perceived. Finally, others have suggested that stress 
may not operate in such a global Fashion and that its effects are primarily on atten- 
tion and storage of events, increasing memories for items central to the stressor 
itself (Christianson, 1992; Easterbrook, 1959; Heuer & Reisberg, 1990; Walker, 
1958). Our purpose in the present study was to develop a paradigm to begin explo- 
rations of similarities and differences between children who directly versus vic- 
ariously experienced the often stressful ordeal of preschool inoculations. 
Several studies involving children have already documented that compared 
to bystanders, participants have improved memory and reduced suggestibility 
(e.g., Baker-Ward, Hess, & Flannagan, 1990; Jones, Swift, & Johnson, 1988; 
Rudy & Goodman, 1991; Tobey & Goodman, 1992). One potential limitation 
with these studies, however, was that the children who were in the direct-experi- 
ence conditions did not experience high degrees of stress and pain that often 
accompany physical or sexual abuse. Thus, although these studies examined the 
effects of experience, they did not study that part of the ecological validity ques- 
tion assessing differential levels of perceived pain and stress because they only 
tested memories for events, such as getting a “tattoo” sticker on their arm, play- 
ing “Simon says,” and so on. 
What are the effects of stress on memory and suggestibility‘? The answers to 
these questions are less clear. Many studies have found either no effects or inter- 
fering effects of stress on memory (e.g., Bugental, Blue, Cortez, Fleck, & 
Rodriguez, 1992; Merritt, Ornstein, & Spicker, 1994; Ornstein, Gordon, & Larus, 
1992; Peters, 1991). However, Goodman, Hirschman, Hepps, and Rudy (1991) 
found higher levels of recall associated with higher levels of stress. In a second 
The authors thank Martin Amerihner; M a p  Chapman. and Peter Ornstein for their help- 
ful comments and suggestions regarding earlier versions of thiJ article. Thev also thank 
University Pediatrics and Joseph Werthammer; Gilbert Ratclifl and Joseph Evans; Stone 
and Thomas Department Stores: and the Department of Health in Huntingron for their 
assistance. Karla Dick. Deborah Children, and Carolee McCallister helped with the data 
coding and analysis. 
Address correspondence to Marc A .  Lindberg, Department of Psychology, Marshall 
University. Huntington. WV 25755; findberg@marshall.edu (e-nlail). 
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3 16 The Journul of Genetic Psychology 
study, Goodman et al. (1991) compared children who received inoculations to 
children who only received a decal rubbed onto their arm and leg. They found 
that the less stressed children who were not inoculated recalled more incorrect 
information than those who had been inoculated. However, because the to-be- 
remembered information was qualitatively different, strong conclusions were not 
possible. In another interesting study, Quas et al. (1999) found that high levels of 
stress were associated with poorer general free-recall performance but superior 
cued-recall performance and lowered suggestibility. 
Why were the results from the different studies so different? One reason 
might be that Goodman (1991) tested specific features related to the stressor itself 
(questions about where they were touched and identifications of the nurse) as 
compared to the other investigators, who typically tested either overall recall, 
recall of all details added together (cf. Merritt, Ornstein, & Spicker, 1994), or 
details unrelated to the stressor (cf. Peters, 1991). In line with Christianson’s 
(1992) theory, it could be reasoned that if an item tested was congruent with the 
stressor, then better retention would be the most likely result. If, on the other hand, 
the item was peripheral to the stressor, then either no differences or perhaps even 
poorer retention would result. According to Christianson ( 1992), the reason for 
this improved recall for features congruent with emotional events is that they 
receive preferential initial processing because of increased attention (Easter- 
brook, 1959). Christianson (1992) said that a second way in which information 
congruent with the stressor could lead to superior retention would be through 
increased elaborative processing that would create stronger traces. Both the 
increased attention and elaborative processing views would predict that informa- 
tion congruent with the stressor would show less steep forgetting curves. 
This line of reasoning is similar to the “flashbulb hypothesis” (Brown & 
Kulik, 1977), which proposes that a highly emotionally arousing event can pro- 
duce a vivid memory of the details of that event. Since the original research by 
Brown and Kulik (1977), there have been many other studies whose findings have 
supported the flashbulb hypothesis (e.g., Bohannon, 1988; Christianson, 1989; 
Winograd & Killenger, 1983), including several in the literature on children (e.g., 
Terr, 1983, 1996; Warren & Swartwood, 1992). However, all were studies of real- 
life events, and, as Christianson (1992) noted, one major problem was the lack of 
a comparable low-stress event. Without such a control event and tests of memo- 
ries at different delays, it was impossible to determine whether flashbulb memo- 
ries were truly distinct entities that had the same rates of forgetting as other mem- 
ories. Furthermore, most flashbulb memory studies have typically studied 
discoveries of emotional events (e.g., the JFK assassination, the Challenger 
explosion), rather than personally experienced stressful events (Winograd & 
Neisser, 1992). Thus, most studies on different notions of flashbulb memories 
have not compared personally experienced emotional events with vicariously 
experienced events. In the present study, we sought to provide a paradigm to do 
this and offer initial descriptive data on such comparisons. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
arc
 A
. L
ind
be
rg
] a
t 0
2:5
6 1
3 F
eb
ru
ary
 20
12
 
Lindberg, Jones, McComas Collard, & Thomas 317 
The present study was designed to explore factorial combinations of the fol- 
lowing: (a) different levels of stress (measured by subjective pain of the inocula- 
tion), (b) experience (those who received the shot versus those in the yoked-con- 
trol group who watched the experimental group child’s procedures on videotape), 
(c) time of test (tests at 5 min, 20 min, and 1 month), and (d) type of memory 
trace tested (details congruent versus unrelated to the stressor). Thus, children in 
a natural or quasi experiment were compared to children in a yoked-control 
group, who merely viewed the same things vicariously on a videotape. It was 
hypothesized that when details congruent with the stress were tested (e.g., iden- 
tifications of the nurses), those directly experiencing the stress would show bet- 
ter memories than those vicariously experiencing the painful inoculations (Chris- 
tianson, 1992). However, in line with Lindberg, Kiefer. and Thomas’s (2000) 
distinction between memories for details versus inferences and their notions of 
congruence, if memories for judgments and inferences were tested that were relat- 
ed to perceived pain (e.g., “size of needle”), then it was hypothesized that stress 
would act like a suggestion (or more properly an auto-suggestion), and those 
directly experiencing it would be more likely to overestimate its size (Bruner & 
Goodman, 1947). If items were tested that were extremely peripheral to the stres- 
son, then differences in  memory performance might favor the yoked controls. 
Method 
Participants 
The average age of the children was 5.05 (SD = .42) years, and 42 boys and 
44 girls participated. The children participated in either of two conditions, expe- 
riential or yoked control, with the restriction that an equal proportion of boys and 
girls were placed in each counterbalancing condition. The experiential group par- 
ticipants were children who were required to get their prekindergarten inocula- 
tions. In the first phase of testing, 22 participants for the experiential group were 
recruited from daycare centers and preschools with the help of a local pediatric 
practice. The children were from predominantly upper-middle-class homes. After 
receiving informed consent forms signed by the parents, the experimenters called 
and scheduled a time for the child’s preschool DPT and oral polio inoculations 
at the health department. Because of difficulties in obtaining enough participants, 
the experimenters waited for 2 months (i.e., until 4 weeks before the beginning 
of school) and recruited at the health center as children and their parents came in 
for free inoculations. To provide incentives for participation in the second wave 
of testing, those who participated were offered a $10.00 gift certificate from Stone 
and Thomas Department Stores and a $1.00 lottery ticket. An additional 21 chil- 
dren for the experiential group were recruited in  this fashion. These children were 
from a lower income area than the first sample and all were White. They were 
4.08 months older than the first group of participants. 
The children in the yoked-control group, who had not yet received the inoc- 
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ulations at the time of testing, were tested I year later. Waiting 1 year allowed for 
the yoked-control population to be selected without confounds, where yoked-con- 
trol children could have known the experimental children, and also afforded the 
possibility of matching more closely age and daycare center. The children in the 
yoked-control group were selected from the same daycare centers and preschools 
as the children in the experiential group, or they were from the same neighbor- 
hood. Thus, each child in the yoked-control group was yoked to one of the 43 
children in the experiential group, in terms of daycare center or preschool, neigh- 
borhood, age, race, or sex. There was only one Black child in the experiential 
group and therefore only one in the yoked-control group. At the end of the exper- 
iment, the yoked-control group received a small course on trips to the doctor and 
inoculations to reduce any fears that could have been produced from seeing chil- 
dren who appeared to be temfied and crying. 
Procedures 
When the children and their mothers and fathers arrived at the health depart- 
ment, one of the experimenters greeted them and tested the child’s knowledge of 
colors as he or she waited in the lobby. All children had to demonstrate knowledge 
of color labels by correctly pointing to the color patches on the card, a color card 
that would later be used to test their retention of the colors of the things witnessed. 
The parents were instructed to hold their child on their laps in each of the rooms 
and remain silent while the child was being interviewed. The experimenter oper- 
ating the camera began filming as soon as the child entered the room to have his 
or her temperature taken. The male experimenter operating the camera followed 
them into the room and continued filming from behind the chair where the child 
was seated. The camera followed the head movements of the child in an attempt 
to approximate the child’s visual field. Views of the child’s face were not includ- 
ed, then, and what was looked at by each child in the experiential group was placed 
in the center of the camera angle for the child’s counterpart in the yoked-control 
group. After a typical wait of about 2 min in the temperature room, the tempera- 
ture nurse placed a white thermometer under the arm of the child. After the ther- 
mometer was removed, the nurse told the child his or her temperature. 
When the child was led to the next room for his or her injection, the exper- 
imenter operating the camera followed and again stood behind the chair where 
the child was again seated on the parent’s lap. The door was closed and the nurse 
first gave the oral polio vaccine, which was approximately 1/2 oz of liquid, which 
tasted like fruit-flavored Koolaid. The nurse then administered the DPT injection 
with a 12-cm syringe and needle in the arm. Filming stopped when the child left 
the room. 
After the injection, the child and the parent were taken to the interview room. 
A female experimenter greeted them, and the child was allowed to choose 
between several small candy bars and immediately eat the one selected to help 
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Lindberg. Jones. McCornas Collard, & Thomas 319 
reduce stress and change the climate after just having been hurt by a stranger in 
the previous room. Children were told that if they answered the questions as well 
as they could, they would be given another candy bar when they went home. To 
establish rapport, the experimenter first asked the children to give their name and 
then to recall a favorite television program. The experimenter then asked them to 
try and remember everything that happened to them from the point where they 
entered the building until that moment. If the child did not say anything, the 
experimenter prompted with a question about what happened when they first 
came into the building, and then questions prompting what happened next were 
asked throughout their free recall. All responses were tape-recorded and later 
written down verbatim. The experimenter then introduced the child to the 6-point 
Likert scale of smiley faces. The faces ranged from one with a big smile to one 
with a big frown and five tears. The children were asked to point to a face that 
best described how much fun  it would be to go through the shot experience again. 
After this question, half were given the leading question, “Where did they place 
the yellow thermometer when they took your temperature?” The other half were 
asked, “Where did they place the thermometer when they took your tempera- 
ture?’ (Here it should be noted that the thermometer was white.) The half that did 
not receive the leading question about the thermometer were given the question 
“Where did they place the green needle when they gave the shot?’ The half that 
received the leading question about the thermometer were given the question 
“Where did they place the needle when they gave the shot?’ (Here i t  should be 
noted that the shot device was blue.) The repeated-measure feature of the lead- 
ing question manipulation was to increase sampling of questions by having each 
child participate in both the experiential and control groups. The next question 
asked them to show with their hands how big the syringe (“plunger thing and nee- 
dle”) was. They were instructed to indicate by spreading their hands, and the 
experimenter measured how far their hands were spread apart. After this 5-min 
testing period, they and their mothers or their fathers were taken to a large wait- 
ing room where the caretakers read Dr. Seuss books to the children for 20 min. 
After the 20 min, the children and parents returned to the testing room, where 
the same experimenter gave a different test of memory that was designed to exam- 
ine the manipulations of the first test and also test additional information. Ques- 
tioning again began with a rapport-building process by asking the children for 
their favorite story and character in the story, and then giving them the same free- 
recall question, with the same type of prompting, that began the 5-min testing 
session. The children were then questioned about the colors of the lab coats of 
the temperature and shot nurses. The children were instructed to point to one of 
seven colors on the card they had seen in the waiting room, colors that were pre- 
selected to match the colors of the uniforms of the nurses and other colors in the 
inoculation environment. They were then shown a 6-point smiley-face card with 
six smiley faces ranging progressively from one with a straight mouth, to one with 
slightly turned-down corners of the mouth, to ones with bigger frowns, to one 
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320 The Journal of Genetic Psychology 
with two tears, to one with a big frown with five tears going down from the eyes. 
They were instructed to point to how painful it was when the shot was given, 
when temperature was taken, and when the polio liquid was injected into the 
mouth. After these questions, they were asked what was on the table where the 
syringes were kept, and then they were asked to point to the color card to indi- 
cate the colors of the thermometer and the syringe. The experimenter then 
assessed memory for the identifications of the temperature and shot nurses. She 
showed the child a lineup of six pictures of the nurses that had given the shots 
and taken temperatures along with other nurses sampled from a local hospital 
selected to be somewhat similar in age to the shot nurse. The temperature nurse 
stood out from the lineup in that she had gray hair and was about 25 or more years 
older than the other nurses, who all appeared to be around 40. In this way, a fair 
lineup was presented for the shot nurse, and to test for generalizability of find- 
ings across different testing formats, the temperature nurse test was used to max- 
imize performance and explore if such biased tests were differentially affected by 
stress and experience. After this lineup questioning, the children were asked to 
point to the colors of the temperature nurse’s and shot nurse’s shoes. The exper- 
imenter then showed the child a picture of the lab table from the injection room, 
where the syringes were kept, and asked, “What three things were not on the table 
when you were in the room?’ This recognition testing was done several questions 
after the recall question to attempt again to maximize performance and explore 
if such tests showed different patterns of results. The eight things that were on 
the table were cotton swabs, needles, alcohol, a metal container containing tongue 
depressors, a container for discarded needle tips, and small bottles containing the 
inoculation fluid. The three things that did not belong were fairly obvious: a white 
coffee cup, a large jar of coffee creamer, and a large yellow tub of baby wipes. 
The experimenter prompted until three things were listed. The experimenter then 
said, “It would please me if you said that this didn’t hurt at all. Big kids don’t 
think that it hurts very much.” They were asked to point again at a 6-point smi- 
ley-face card, going from a big smile to one with a big frown with five tears to 
indicate how much fun it would be to go through the procedures once again. It 
should again be noted that this was said after the aforementioned pain-of-needle 
rating was obtained. 
One month later, the same camera man (the senior author) and a different 
female experimenter visited the homes of the children in the experiential group 
to administer the same questions asked at the 20-min test. The different experi- 
menter was used because, typically, in forensic interviews, different people do the 
later questioning (Goodman et al., 1989). However, the questions themselves 
were the same as those in the 20-min interview. 
Because of a change in procedures at the health department, the second group 
of 21 children in the experiential group went through a slightly different set of 
experiences than the first. With these different children, the temperatures were no 
longer taken, and the children went directly into the shot room. They also received 
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Lindberg, Jones, McComas Collard, & Thomas 32 I 
a tuberculin test in addition to the oral polio and the more painful DPT shots. The 
tuberculin test involved having the nurse prick the skin with a very small needle. 
Most children do not perceive this to be as painful as the DPT shot. Thus, these 
children, in contrast to those in the first experiential group, got a relatively pain- 
less shot with a very small needle before getting the more painful DPT inocula- 
tion. Another difference in this group was that they were tested 1 month later in 
their daycare center. Any effects analyzed or discussed due to these differences 
in procedures will be termed “procedures.” Other than these differences, the chil- 
dren went through the same procedures and questions as did the first experiential 
group. 
Each child in the yoked-control group was matched with one of the 43 chil- 
dren in the experiential group, based on daycare center, race, sex, and age. In a 
testing room in the daycare center, each yoked-control group child watched the 
videotape of the experiential-group child with whom he or she was matched. The 
video was clear and displayed the field of vision of the experiential-group child 
from the beginning to the end of the procedures. Because the experiential group 
was not told ahead of time that they would be tested for memory, the yoked-con- 
trol group was merely told to watch this film very carefully. They received the 
memory tests in a different room. Apart from these differences in viewing con- 
ditions, the conditions, questions, time intervals, and so forth, of the Yoked con- 
trols were matched to those of their Experiential counterparts. 
Coding 
To explore possible differences in memory that could result from various lev- 
els of stress, it was necessary to develop measures for the perceived stress inde- 
pendent variable. Two approaches to measuring the construct of stress were used, 
one experimenter based and one child based. The experimenter-based measures 
were taken by experimenters who viewed the videotapes but were blind to the 
children’s memory performance or subjective estimates of pain. They rated the 
taking of the thermometer, polio inoculation, and DPT shot according to the fol- 
lowing scales: 1 = willingly took, 2 = hesitantly took, 3 = mother pushed to take, 
4 =fought mom and nurse. The children’s reactions to these procedures were 
rated on the following scales: 1 = little reaction, 2 = whimpering, 3 = crying, 4 = 
crying and screaming. The experimenters also used stopwatches to time the sec- 
onds of crying behavior that could easily be heard on the videotape and objec- 
tively recorded. The pain of needle construct, as determined by the objective mea- 
sure of crying, was turned into a dichotomous independent variable by dividing 
the sample into two groups, those who cried and those who did not. 
The child estimates of pain of needle were taken from the children’s first rat- 
ing of perceived pain of the needle according to a 6-point Likert scale that used 
a cartoon smiley face that went from a straight mouth to a frown with tears. These 
child-based subjective estimates of pain-of-needle were likewise split into two 
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groups, such that this measure could serve as a dichotomous independent vari- 
able. Those scoring 5 or 6 on the Likert scale, with 6 being the most painful, were 
defined as the high-pain children. Those rating the pain of the shots at 4 or below 
were defined as the low-pain children. These numbers were closest to a median 
split and this variable will be referred to as the subjective pain variable. The 
yoked-control group made similar judgments about their rating of how painful 
they perceived the procedures to be. Because these ratings were not necessarily 
tied to their counterpart in the experiential group, there was not a one-to-one 
matching between experiential and yoked-control group member, using this mea- 
sure of perceived pain. However, because our purpose in the present study was to 
explore actual versus vicarious perceptions of pain using the same scale, this 
approach was most relevant for the kinds of comparisons outlined earlier. In the 
experiential group, there were 20 children in the low-pain group and 23 in the 
high-pain group. In the yoked-control group, there were 18 in the low-pain group 
and 25 in the high-pain group. 
To explore how the two dependent variable measures of stress (cry vs. pain) 
were related, two different kinds of statistical tests were performed: chi-square 
tests and correlations. A 2 (cry vs. no-cry) x 2 (high-pain vs. low-pain) chi-square 
test showed that the two measures were significantly related, x2( 1, N = 86) = 5.59, 
p = .02, with 68% in the cry group rating the experience as high pain and 32% 
rating it as low pain. 
The following were reasons why the subjective pain estimates were used and 
presented in the following presentations of results: (a) chi-square tests showed 
TABLE 1 
Correlations Between Measures of Pain and Reactions to the Procedures 
Rating Crying 
Took React Took React Pain Pain Pain behavior 
Measure polio polio shot shot ther polio shot to the shot@) 
React ther 
Took polio 
React polio 
Took shot 
React shot 
Pain ther 
Pain shot 
Pain polio 
.83** 1 .OO .3 1 .47* .76 .29 .60* * .68 ** 
.70** .5 1 ** .40** .48* .23 .40** .76** 
.32* .41** .76** .22 .53** .59** 
.70** .01 .38** .09 .66** 
.I9 .42** .07 .70** 
.I0 .32* .23 
.02 
.I0 .22* 
Nore. The number of observations averaged 22 for the thermometer and shot measures, and 43 for the 
other measures. Took polio. took shots = ratings of the children’s willingness to take oral polio vac- 
cine and shot. React polio, react shot, react ther = ratings of children’s reactions to vaccine, shot, and 
thermometer. Pain shot, pain ther, pain polio = children’s ratings of pain. 
* p  < .05. **p < .01. 
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that the two measures were related; (b) the two measures correlated significant- 
ly with one another (see Table I) ;  ( c )  they revealed similar patterns of results, 
with the subjective pain measure being somewhat more robust than the cry sta- 
tistic (cf. Merritt, Ornstein, & Spicker, 1994); (d) the subjective pain variable 
allowed factorial comparisons of experience and stress; and (e) the subjective esti- 
mates of pain might have more pragmatic utility in  cases of abuse, where the child 
is often the only witness and it would be rather presumptuous for an adult to be 
the judge. The correlations between the various measures of pain and reactions 
to the procedures can be seen in  Table 1. 
Results 
Preliminary analysis indicated no significant effects associated with the chil- 
dren’s sex, Therefore, the data were collapsed across this factor. Age was also not 
used as an independent variable as i t  was discovered to be confounded with first 
versus second set of procedures. The average age in  the second procedures (M = 
5.27) was significantly higher than that in the first procedures (M = 4.93), F( I, 
8 I )  = 8.06, p < .01. Therefore. to analyze continuous variables, a regression analy- 
sis was first performed using age as the independent variable. Then in the analy- 
sis of variance, the variance in the dependent variable due to age was partialed 
out. In this way the predicted recall based on age was subtracted from the actual 
score leaving only the variance accounted for by the analyzed independent vari- 
able to be tested. For chi-square analyses of discrete variables, a data set was cre- 
ated that equated age across condition by randomly eliminating the oldest chil- 
dren from the discrepant conditions resulting in 73 children for these analyses. 
Nurse Identifications 
Although similar to children in the yoked-control group at the 20-min test, 
children in the experiential group were more accurate at the I-month test in their 
identifications of the temperature nurse, ~ ~ ( 1 ,  N = 38) = 7.94, p < ,005. These 
results may be seen in Figure 1. If there was differential forgetting between the 
experiential and yoked-control groups over the month interval, then one would 
expect that of those who got it right on the first test, more in the control group 
than in the experiential group would get it wrong on the second test. A Fisher’s 
exact test found that the probability of correctly identifying the temperature nurse 
on the second test, given a correct on the first test, was higher (p < .01) for the 
experiential group than the yoked-control group. Of the 13 children in the expe- 
riential group who got it right on the 20-min test, 12 were also correct on the 1- 
month test. Of the 13 children in the yoked-control group who got it right on the 
20-min test, only 6 were correct on the 1-month test. 
The same pattern was found for identification of the nurse who gave the 
shots. Although similar on the 20-min test, children in the experiential group were 
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20 Min 1 Month 
Temperature nurse test 
Experimentals Yoked controls 
FIGURE 1. Percent of children correctly identifying the temperature nurse as 
a function of time of test and whether they directly experienced the shot (expe- 
riential group) or merely viewed it vicariously (yoked-control group). 
more accurate in their identifications of the shot nurse at the I-month test than 
were those in the yoked-control group, who merely watched the events on video- 
tape, x2( 1, N = 69) = 4.68, p = .03. Those results can be seen in Figure 2. To more 
precisely test the possibility of differential rates of forgetting, a Fisher’s exact test 
showed that the probability of identifying the shot nurse correctly on the second 
test, given a correct on the first test, was higher 0) < .05) for the experiential group 
than the yoked-control group. Of the 12 children in the experiential who got it 
right on the first test, 7 got it correct on the 1-month test. Of the 8 members of 
the yoked-control group who got it right on the 20-min test, only one got it right 
on the 1-month test. 
Clothing of Nurses 
The children were asked to recall the colors of the shoes and coats worn by 
the temperature and shot nurses. There were no significant differences in coat 
color identification for either nurse. The temperature nurse’s coat color was cor- 
rectly identified out of the sample of seven colors on a card by 24% of the chil- 
dren at the 20-min test and by 32% at the one month test. The shot nurse’s coat 
was correctly identified by 41% of the children at the 20-min test and by 16% at 
the 1-month test. The color of the temperature nurse’s shoes was correctly iden- 
tified by 11% at the 20-min test and by 27% at the 1-month test. A significant 
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20 Min 1 Month 
Shot nurse test 
H Experimentals 0 Yoked controls 
FIGURE 2. Percent of children correctly identifying the shot nurse as a function 
of time of test and whether they directly experienced the shot (experiential group) 
or merely viewed it vicariously (yoked-control group). 
experiential versus yoked control difference for correct identifications of the tem- 
perature nurse’s shoe color at the one month test was found, xz( I ,  N = 37) = 4.50, 
p = .03. Of the 27% correct, 80% were in the control group and 20% were in the 
experiential group. In identifications of the shot nurse’s shoe color, 12% were cor- 
rect at the 20-min test and 16% were correct at 1 month. No other effects were 
significant. 
Needle Size 
The children were asked “How big were the plunger and needle thing that 
gave you your shot?’ They were to estimate the size of the needle by using both 
hands. It was questionable whether the two procedures were equated for purpos- 
es of needle analyses. As noted, because of changes in procedure at the health 
department, children in the second group of procedures received a tuberculin test 
in addition to the DPT shot. Both the TB test and the DPT shot punctured the skin 
in two different places, and were different colors. Given that the children in the 
second experiment were given two shots, and the experimenters asked the same 
question about “the shot,” it was possible that some children may have mistak- 
enly reported the size, color, or placement of the TB test needle and plunger when 
asked for those details of the “needle.” Thus, data from procedure 2 were not 
included in analyses regarding attributes of the needle. 
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To determine if the children differed in their estimates of needle size, a 2 
(experience) x 2 (pain) x 3 (time of test) analysis of variance was performed. A 
significant interaction for experience by pain was found, F( I ,  34) = 7.67, p < .01. 
Post hoc Tukey HSD tests revealed that children who directly experienced the 
procedures showed the perceived pain effect, with those rating the shot as painful 
estimating it to be M = 20.00 cm, SD = 10.88, and those who rated it as less 
painful, estimating it to be M = 11.15 cm, SD = 9.20. Such differences were not 
found for the controls, where those who perceived the shot to be more painful 
estimated it to be M = 17.21, SD = 9.37, compared to those who rated it to be less 
painful, M = 22.03, SD = 13.07. No other effects were significant. 
Other Attributes of the Needle and Thermometer 
One half of the children received leading questions about the color of the 
needle and the other half were given leading questions about the color of the ther- 
mometer. Because of the mentioned differences in procedures, only the first pro- 
cedure group’s data could be used in the other chi-square analyses of the attrib- 
utes of the needle and thermometer. Because this left the analyses with too few 
potential children to examine interactions between perceived pain, sex, time of 
test, and so on, only simple two-way tests were performed. No significant effects 
were observed for the pain variable, leading questions, or time of test. It was 
found that 63% of the children correctly pointed out the color of the needle at 20- 
min and 68% did so at the I-month test. Furthermore, 86% correctly reported its 
placement. With the thermometer, 63% correctly identified its placement (under 
the arm) at the 5-min test, 63% at the 20-min test, and 68% at the I-month test. 
On tests of the color of the thermometer, it was found that the experiential group 
was more accurate than the yoked-control group on the first test of thermometer 
color, x2( 1, N = 38) = 7.23, p < .01, with 84% of the experiential group getting it 
correct on the first test and 42% of the yoked-control group getting it correct. This 
did not hold for the second test. No other differences, including effects of lead- 
ing questions, sex, perceived pain, experiential versus yoked control, were sig- 
nificant for other attributes of the needle and thermometer. 
Items on Table 
Both recall and recognition were tested for items that were used during the 
inoculations and on a lab table in the room. The children were tested for recall 
by asking, “Remember that there was a table where the syringes and needles 
were kept? What other things were on the table?’ Recognition testing for items 
on the table involved showing the children a picture of the lab table from the 
injection room and asking, “What three things were not on the table when you 
were in the room?’ This was done several questions after the recall question. 
There were no significant effects of pain or experiential condition for either mea- 
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sure. Recall averaged 1.14 items, and recognition of the three things not on the 
table was 1.63. 
Memories for the Gist 
To test overall recall of the gist, all children were asked to say what happened 
from the time they entered the building until they left. They were prompted for 
what happened next throughout their recalls. The responses were scored and cat- 
egorized by a group of raters in terms of the number of idea units. These were 
items referring to things in the room, things referring to procedures, things refer- 
ring to persons encountered, and things referring to the pain. Interrater reliabili- 
ty was high ( r  = .!Jl) in classifying these idea units. Total correct and incorrect 
idea units and words produced were analyzed by 2 (experience) x 2 (pain) x 2 
(procedures) x 3 (time of test) analysis of variances. No significant main effects 
or interactions were found for total number of correct or incorrect words pro- 
duced. Similarly, no significant effects were found for correct or incorrect idea 
units recalled. The children recalled an average of 3.8 1 correct idea units (SD = 
2.05) and .25 (SD = .42) incorrect units. (These levels of recall were about 2 fewer 
than the same aged participants tested at 1 week, as reported by Ornstein, Shapiro, 
Clubb, Follmer, & Baker-Ward, 1997, who tested for a doctor visit that included 
many more possible things and procedures to recall.) There were no significant 
effects of any condition for differences in correct ( M  = 1 1.74, SD = 6.13) or incor- 
rect (M = .76, SD = 1.28) total words produced. Basement effects precluded 
meaningful analyses of the type of word data. 
To measure the children’s general impression of what happened, we asked 
them, “Overall, how much fun would it be to go through all that again?’The chil- 
dren responded to n “smiley” face going from a big smile = l ,  to a bigfrown with 
tears = 6. They were asked this question at the immediate test, the 20-min test, 
and the 1 -month test. The only significant effect revealed was the main effect of 
pain, F( 1, 82) = 15.93, p < .01. As would be expected, those who said it hurt a 
great deal rated the whole experience worse (“somewhat terrible” M = 3.62) than 
those who said it did not hurt as much (“fun” M = 2.18). Thus, their ratings of 
the pain of the shot were significantly related to their ratings of the whole expe- 
rience, but the direct versus vicarious experience variable and the suggestions 
were not. 
Discussion 
This natural or quasi experiment that compared the experiential group, which 
directly experienced the painful DPT inoculations, with the yoked-control group, 
which merely viewed the experiences vicariously, more specifically tested Chris- 
tianson’s (1992) hypotheses that stress and direct experience do not operate in a 
ubiquitous fashion. The repeated-measure feature of this design, testing at 20 min 
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and at 1 month, was the first to specifically test the possibility of differential for- 
getting rates, a test deemed important by several investigators (Baker-Ward, Hess, 
& Flannagan, 1990; Brown & Kulik, 1977; Burke, Heuer, & Reisberg, 1992; 
Christianson & Kubinette, in press; Christianson & Loftus, 1987, 1991; Hosch & 
Bothwell, 1990; Howe, Courage, & Peterson, 1996; Jones, Swift, & Johnson, 
1988; Tobey & Goodman, 1992; Wagennaar & Groeneweg, 1990; Yuille & Cut- 
shall, 1986). For identifications of both the shot and temperature nurse, the Fish- 
er exact tests found that the experiential group had superior memories and greater 
resistance to forgetting over the 1-month interval (Goodman et al., 1991). Thus, 
the findings were consistent and robust across different sample sizes and lineup 
characteristics, emphasizing the fact that these memory-by-experience interactions 
were consistent and not subject to small parametric variations in design. Howev- 
er, when items that were peripheral to the stressors were tested, for example, shoe 
color, then the yoked controls showed superior performance (Peters, 1991). 
A related methodological point that had practical as well as theoretical impli- 
cations involved the higher levels of performance on temperature-nurse identifi- 
cation as compared to shot-nurse identification. As was seen in the Method sec- 
tion, the temperature nurse stood out in the lineup because she was the only one 
to have gray hair and a red vest. She appeared to be at least 25 years older than 
the others, who all had brown or darker blonde hair. In the case of the shot nurse, 
a more valid test of recognition memory was performed and more than 75% of 
the children named the wrong person. However, in  the biased test with the tem- 
perature nurse, only about 25% of the children named the wrong person. Was the 
better performance due to test conditions that tapped some thread of memory that 
was still there? What are the validities of partial versus whole memories? The 
present study could not say, and hypotheses on the validity of partial information 
(Fisher & McCauley, 1995) must be explored by further memory research. 
Although the differential performance on nurse recall was robust, the nature 
of the present design did not allow for a precise test of the mechanisms that might 
be responsible for this finding. The data did, however, present some hypotheses 
for further studies to test. We observed that the degree of stress involved with each 
person to be identified, the shot nurse and the temperature nurse, both showed 
similar effects on recognition. Furthermore, the level of perceived pain did not 
enter into the results. We could, therefore, suppose that either the more extreme 
stress of the shot nurse carried over to bolster the memory of the temperature 
nurse, or that it takes personal experience with a relatively novel stressful event 
to help shield the trace from such rapid rates of forgetting. Alternatively, and in 
line with the favored hypothesis of Christianson (1992), we could suppose that 
the central features of the experience were rehearsed and more elaborately coded 
by those who experienced it directly. Thus, when testing at the 20-min interval, 
those directly experiencing the event may have processed their selection more 
fully. Which of the above hypotheses is correct must be worked out by further 
research. The present approach offers a good way to address these hypotheses. 
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To test these hypotheses, one should also use more analytic designs similar to 
those developed by Brainerd, Reyna. Howe, and Kingma (1990). At any rate, the 
present paradigm, by testing a vicarious versus direct personal experience with 
painful stimuli, and testing with different delays in the same design, found that 
videotape bystander studies may underestimate memory performance for items 
congruent with the stressor when assessed at longer delays. 
If arousal and personal experience were associated with better recall, then 
how could they also have produced more inaccurate inferences of needle size? 
The finding of motivational states and congruency entering into overestimates in 
perception was found long ago by Bruner and Goodman (1947) during their work 
on estimating coin sizes. In the classic Bruner and Goodman study, poorer chil- 
dren estimated that a coin was bigger than wealthier children did. These results 
were also in line with the findings that flashbulb or emotion-eliciting events are 
not retained as photographically complete memories (Christianson, 1992; Heuer 
& Reisberg, 1990; McCloskey, Wible, & Cohen, 1988: Warren & Swartwood, 
1992; Winograd & Killenger, 1983). The study by Bruck, Ceci, Francoeur, and 
Barr (1995) also found that children can be suggestible even about procedures 
central to their own bodies, such as touches and perceived pain, when tested at 
longer intervals after repeated suggestions. In the case of the needle, if children 
from the experiential conditions thought that the shot was a “big hurt,” then they 
tended to estimate that the needle was a “big needle.” If they did not, then those 
in the experiential group were fairly accurate in their estimations of needle size. 
The controls, on the other hand, were not as influenced by their vicarious esti- 
mations of pain. 
It is important to discuss another cautionary methodological note that has 
theoretical implications for explanations of the needle-size data. In this study, we 
defined centrality and congruency in terms of congruency with the stressors: the 
needle and the assailants. It could have been that children who experienced the 
shot and high levels of distress chose not to focus on the needle. Thus, although 
it would have been in range for the camera to follow, some of these children may 
have chosen to either close their eyes or not follow it as closely with their eyes. 
In this way, they may have never encoded the size of the needle, or perhaps encod- 
ed it similarly to the controls and more poorly than their counterparts in the low- 
pain condition. Therefore, they may have based their judgments on guesses rather 
than on some representation of pain plus the actual needle size. Another example 
of this hypothesis as used to explain the coin estimate data of the Bruner and 
Goodman (1947) study would be that the poorer children may not have remem- 
bered the exact size of the coin due to their lack of experience through poverty. 
(Here it should be pointed out that it has been clearly demonstrated that blend- 
ing is not a very viable hypothesis explaining suggestibility [Lindberg, Kiefer, & 
Thomas, 20001.) If one were able to use eye movements in similar designs, one 
might be able to better define centrality than was done in the present study or in 
other studies and better test the encoding interpretation. By using such micro- 
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genic designs, one might be able to more specifically operationally define cen- 
trality and therefore more specifically test the strength of the arguments advanced 
here. Thus, more analytic microgenic designs must be carried out to observe indi- 
vidual differences in attentional focusing, such that the psychological mecha- 
nisms responsible for congruency effects can better be described. 
In summary, one of the main goals of this study was to develop a paradigm 
to explore children’s eyewitness testimony by comparing those who participated 
in a stressful procedure with those who merely viewed the actions on a video- 
tape. The children were very accurate on most aspects of the needle (placement 
and color), indicating that both groups focused on the needle, or “weapon” (cf. 
Cutler, Penrod, & Martens, 1987; Kramer, Buckhout, & Eugenio, 1990). Over 
80% of the children correctly identified the placement of the needle, and over 
65% correctly identified the color of the needle, the color of the thermometer, and 
the placement of the thermometer. Leading questions, personal experience, and 
perceived pain did not seem to be large factors in these analyses. This was con- 
sistent with the findings of Melton (1992) and Saywitz, Goodman, Nicholas, and 
Moan (199 I),  where retention was found to be quite good for the retention of cen- 
tral details. The seemingly conflicting results on stress and personal experience 
and those in the literature made good sense if the notion of congruency was com- 
bined with the stressors and Christianson’s (1992) and Easterbrook’s (1959) the- 
ories of attentional focusing. Notions of stress and pain operating ubiquitously as 
a central mediator (Steward & Steward, 1996) or in some simple Yerkes-Dodson 
(1908) fashion did not seem to apply. If the item was tested at longer delays and 
was congruent with the stressor, then better retention was found with assailant 
identification (cf. Goodman et al., 1991). In this sense, the laboratory studies 
using videotapes did not parallel situations in which the children experienced the 
stress themselves when testing occurred at long delays. However, if the item to 
be tested was peripheral to the stressor (items on the table, colors of the nurses’ 
coats), or if a global measure of memory for gist was used, then few if any dif- 
ferences between yoked controls who merely viewed the procedures on video- 
tape and those who experienced the pain and events themselves were found (cf. 
Baker-Ward, Gordon, Omstein, Larus, & Clubb, 1993). If the item was very 
peripheral to the central stressor as with the color of the temperature nurse’s 
shoes, then the yoked-control group showed better performance (cf. Peters, 
199 I). If inferences about needle size were made, then those directly experienc- 
ing more stress were more suggestible. Finally, the yoked controls vicariously 
experiencing the stress were not more prone to the suggestions and did not dif- 
fer on memories for the gist. These results support those theorists who have sug- 
gested that stress should not be treated as some ubiquitous variable. In conclu- 
sion, questions of vicarious experiences being ecologically valid were found to 
be too general. Thus, one cannot discount laboratory studies as being ecologically 
invalid nor can one easily conclude that they directly mirror cases in which chil- 
dren have experienced abuse or physical pain themselves. Rather, focusing on 
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what different experiences can d o  to lead to variations i n  attention, personal rel- 
evance, rehearsal, and motivation seems to be the most fruitful approach. 
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